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Beware of lawyers bearing gifts: A critical evaluation of the Report of WG II to the
European Convention on incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights
and accession to the European Convention of Human Rights.

Introduction
This article undertakes a critical analysis of the fundamental rights provisions of the draft
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe as presented to the President of the
European Council in Rome on 18 July 2003 (the “draft Constitution”),1 and in particular
the Articles in Parts I and II of the draft Constitution incorporating proposals made in the
final Report of Working Group II (“WG II”) on “Incorporation of the Charter/Accession
to the ECHR” (the “Report”).2 A central issue in any reform process, in particular when
it involves establishing a constitutional bill of rights, is identifying the objectives to be
achieved by a particular constitutional provision: “When a legal norm is expressed as an
article in an institutional framework, it is articulated in a particular manner for a
particular purpose”.3 It is the contention of this article that a number of the
recommendations of WG II failed to meet this standard and this failure was endorsed by
the in extenso acceptance of the Report by the Convention on the Future of Europe (the
“Convention”).
A plethora of reform proposals have contributed to the proposed modifications to the
existing system of protection of fundamental rights in the draft Constitution.4 The two
* Lecturer in Law at the Dublin Institute of Technology. This article was written in 2003.
A condensed version of the article is published as: ‘Beware of lawyers bearing gifts: A
critical evaluation of the Proposals on Fundamental Rights in the EU Constitutional
Treaty.’ [2004] 4 European Human Rights Law Review, pp. 424-435. The author
gratefully acknowledges comments on drafts of this article from Professor Javaid
Rehman. The views expressed in this article are strictly personal to the author.
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CONV 850/03. Available on the Convention website at http//:european-convention.eu.int. All documents
referred to in this article available on this website are not further referenced. References to specific Articles
in Part I, II or III of the draft Constitution omit reference to the draft Constitution.
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CONV 354/02: WG II 16, Brussels, October 22, 2002.Available on the Convention website. For a
detailed study on the Report see the Sixth Report of the Select Committee of the House of Lords, The
Future Status of The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Session 2002-2003. HL Paper 48. HMSO.
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Teraya Koji, ‘Emerging Hierarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the Perspective of
Non-derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 EJIL 917.
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See, for example, the proposals for reform of P.Alston and J.H.H.Weiler, ‘An ‘Ever Closer Union’ in
Need of a Human Rights Policy: The European Union and Human Rights’, in P. Alston, M. Bustelo and J.
Heenan (eds.), The EU and Human Rights (OUP, 1999) 3. The critical role of the European Parliament in
providing impetus for change is analysed in the same volume by R. Rack and S. Lausegger, ‘The Role of
the European Parliament: Past and Future’, 801.

1

principal recommendations of WG II adopted by the Convention, the creation of a
constitutional mandate for the Union to accede to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “ECHR”)5 and
incorporation of the Charter of fundamental rights of the European Union (the “Charter”)
in the draft Constitution as a legally binding text,6 reflect the balance of political and
academic opinion in favor of both initiatives.7
However, WG II in general did not provide policy justification for the recommendations
in the Report, justifying its technical and legal approach8 on the grounds of its limited
terms of reference.9 This approach was, however, pursued selectively insofar as several
recommendations in the Report were influenced by political pressure from the Member
States and resulted in changes of substance, in particular as regards the Charter,10 while in
other cases it was used to avoid addressing potentially beneficial reforms to fundamental
rights protection in the Union. The suspicion that, notwithstanding WG II’s statement that
the political decision on incorporation of the Charter and accession to the ECHR should
be reserved to the Convention Plenary,11 the Report represented a ‘done deal’ was
reinforced by the uncritical adoption by the Convention of the Report. The President of
the Convention’s exhortation to the Member States not to amend the basis of the draft
Constitution at the Intergovernmental Conference opened at Rome on October 4, 2003
(the “IGC”),12 further lessened the likelihood of a substantial revision of the Report’s
recommendations as incorporated in the draft Constitution by the IGC.
5

In this article reference is made to accession to the ECHR. The question of which ECHR Protocols the
Union would accede to is, as WG II points out at page 14 of the Report, for the Council to resolve at the
time of accession.
6

On the legal effects of incorporation, see section 7 below.

7

Support is, however, not universal: ‘The Charter simply adds an unnecessary further tier which lacks the
subtlety and flexibility of the current system of negotiation.’: R. Bellamy, ‘Constitutive Citizenship versus
Constitutional Rights: Republican Reflections on the EU Charter and the Human Rights Act’, in T.
Campbell, K.D.Ewing and A.Tomkins (eds.), Sceptical Essays on Human Rights (OUP, 2001) 33. See also
J.H.H.Weiler, ‘Editorial: Does the European Union Truly Need a Charter of Rights?’ (2000) 6 ELJ 95-97.

8

For a valuable synthesis of the arguments against a technocratic view of the lawyer’s role see:
J.H.H.Weiler and A.L.Paulus, ‘The Structure of Change in International Law or Is there a Hierarchy of
Norms in International Law?’(1997) 8 EJIL 545.
9

The mandate of WG II is set out in CONV 72/02. Available on the Convention website.
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The British Government made this explicit: ‘We and some other Member States worked hard in the
Convention on the Future of Europe to help get more clarity and legal certainty into the Charter. The
changes we helped pushed through have put the whole package in much better legal shape’. A
Constitutional Treaty for the EU, The British Approach to the European Intergovernmental Conference
2003, Cm5934 (September 2003), at para.101.
11
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The Report, at 2 and 11.

The Rome Declaration of V.Giscard D’Estaing, President of the Convention, of July 18, 2003 to the
Italian Presidency. Available on the Convention website.
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It is the aim of this article to evaluate the proposals of WG II incorporated into the draft
Constitution by situating them in the context of issues of principle relating to the sources,
scope and enforceability of fundamental rights in the Union. While this analysis lends
strong support to incorporation of the Charter and accession by the Union to the ECHR, it
concludes that a number of other provisions in the draft Constitution, and in particular the
retention of general principles of law as a source of fundamental rights in the Union’s
legal system and the amendments to the Charter to allay concerns of certain Member
States over extensions to the Union’s competence in the field of fundamental rights, are
not justified and merit further critical examination and debate during the IGC process.
1.

Sources of fundamental rights in Union law: undue complexity?

The sources of fundamental rights norms in Union law are exceptionally fluid as a result
of the case by case development of protection by the European Court of Justice (Court of
Justice): “The Court has consistently held that fundamental rights form an integral part of
the general principles of law whose observance the Court ensures…….. For that purpose,
the Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member
States and from the guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of which they are
signatories. In that regard, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms …has particular significance”.13 The Court then specified
that Article 6(2) TEU, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty and unmodified by
either the Amsterdam or Nice Treaties, embodies that case-law.14 The Charter rights and
principles, although not formally incorporated into the Union’s legal order, have become
a further source of fundamental rights standards.15
While WG II did not make a recommendation on the issue of retaining Article 6(2) TEU,
the Convention incorporated in Article I-7(3) a clause with substantially similar wording
whereby fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and ‘as they result from the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall constitute general principles
of the Union’s law’.16 The formulation in both Article 6(2) TEU and Article I-7(3) is
narrower than the existing case law of the Court of Justice on the sources for general
principles of Union law and raises the issue of whether the Court of Justice would
interpret Article I-7(3) as restricting the sources of general principles of law to those
13

Case C-7/98, Krombach v. Bamberski [2000] ECR 1-1935, at para. 25.

14

Ibid, at para. 27.

15

See J.Morijn, ‘Judicial References to the EU Fundamental Rights Charter’ at
http://europe.eu.int/futurum/documents/other/oth000602_en.pdf. Accessed November 2003.
16

The reference in Article I-7(3) to Union law as opposed to Community law in Article 6(2) TEU does not
constitute a substantive change. As S. Peers has argued the reference to Community law in Article 6(2)
TEU is ‘vestigal’ and should be read as referring to Union law: ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in P.
Alston, M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit., at 171.
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specifically referenced. It has been argued, on the basis of Advocate-General Jacob’s
reference to the First Protocol to the ECHR in Bosphorous,17 that Article 6(2) TEU
should not be interpreted in this restrictive sense;18 however, such an argument would be
less persuasive in the context of a constitutional text. The existing principle established
by the Court of Justice that international human rights treaties other than the ECHR may
be used as an interpretative tool in determining the general principles of fundamental
rights law applied by the Court of Justice would, however, remain applicable.19
The current proposals set out in the draft Constitution would further complicate the
overlapping steams of fundamental rights norms flowing into the Union’s legal order. In
general, the establishment of a hierarchy of norms in the field of fundamental rights has
been opposed on the basis that prioritizing certain rights at the expense of others would
threaten the indivisibility of human rights.20 But if an approach based on differential
standards of human rights protection is to be rejected,21 the question of the ordering of
fundamental rights norms originating from these various sources requires resolution. A
constitutional ordering of these potentially competing norms would enhance the
democratic legitimacy of any such resolution.
The draft Constitution does establish, albeit in disparate provisions, an ordering of
fundamental rights within the Union’s legal system according to their source. As regards
rights derived from international law, Article I-3(4) commits the Union to “strict
observance and development of international law, including respect for the principles of
the United Nations Charter”. This provision reflects the existing case law of the Court of
Justice to the effect that public international law forms part of the Union’s public legal
order and that the Union is obliged to respect international law in the exercise of its
powers.22 Article II-53, which is on the same terms as Article 53 of the Charter, provides
specific constitutional authority for the primacy of international law over Charter rights
and principles in the event the latter provide a lesser standard of protection: “Nothing in
this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and
fundamental freedoms as recognized, in their respective fields of application, by Union
17

Case C-84/95, Bosphorous v. Minister for Transport [1996] ECR I-3953.

18

S.Peers, op. cit., at 174.

19

See S.Piers, op. cit., at 171, n.27.

20

See G. Schwarzenberger, ‘International jus cogens?,’ (1965) 43 Texas Law Review 455; P. Weil,
‘Towards Relative Normativity in International law?’ (1983) 77 AJIL 413; and T. Meron, ‘On a Hierarchy
of International Human Rights’ (1986) 80 AJIL 1. However, recent academic opinion has been more
favourable to an ordering of fundamental rights, arguing for example that non-derogable rights can form
the basis of understanding hierarchy in international law: see T. Koji, op. cit.; and J.Tasioulas, ‘In Defence
of Relative Normativity: Communitarian Values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16 OJLS 85; but see the
critique of Tasioulas’ position by J. Beckett, ‘Behind Relative Normativity: Rules and Process as
Prerequisites of Law’ (2001) 12 EJIL 627.
21

See section 3 below.

22

R.Higgins, ‘The ICJ, the ECJ and the Integrity of International Law’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 1.
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law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the
Member States are party, including the ECHR, and by the Member States’ constitutions”.
The principle established by Article II-53 is subject, insofar as concerns Charter rights
corresponding to ECHR rights, to Article II-52(3) which provides that the meaning and
scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the ECHR but without
preventing “Union law providing more extensive protection”. A difficult, but probably
academic,23 question would arise if a ruling of the Court of Human Rights were to
conflict with international law. If the relevant provision of the ECHR corresponded to a
Charter right then Article I-3(4) and Article II-52(3) could conflict, although the Court of
Justice would no doubt strive to interpret the international law norm as providing more
extensive protection so as to avoid such a conflict. If the ECHR provision did not
correspond to a Charter right and formed part of Union law either through accession by
the Union to the ECHR or as a general principle of Union law under Article I-7(3), then
the international law norm should prevail in case of conflict by reason of Article I-3(4).24
Finally there is the issue of ordering the sources of general principles of law specified in
Article I-7(3).25 Clearly no such general principle would be admitted by the Court of
Justice insofar as it conflicted with international law and that is confirmed by Article I3(4). Further, as regards general principles resulting from the constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, no such tradition should be admitted as a general
principle insofar as it conflicts with the ECHR or the Charter since the recognition of any
such conflicting principle in the case of the Charter would be a violation of Article I-7(1)
and in the case of the ECHR would be incompatible both with the mandate for the Union
to accede to the ECHR under Article I-7(2) and the ECHR as a source of fundamental
rights under the general principles case law. Accession by the Union to the ECHR would,
of course, in addition make the adoption of such a tradition in conflict with the ECHR a
breach of the Union’s obligations under international law. The implausibility of these
scenarios provides support for the argument that retention of general principles as a
source of law under Article I-7(3) is unnecessary and confusing.26

2. A ‘Lawyer’s Paradise’? : Union Fundamental Rights and the Rule of Law
23

‘Its [the Court of Human Rights] starting point is that human rights law, including the Convention on
Human Rights, is part of international law.’ R.Higgins, ibid, at 10.
24

‘One may therefore conclude – tentatively – that an international agreement entered into by the
Community will be of no effect within the Community legal system if it is outside the capacity of the
Community or if it conflicts with one of the constituent Treaties or (possibly) with a general principle of
law’: T.C.Hartley, op. cit., at 185-186.
25

On the hierarchical relationship between general principles and the Community Treaties see T. Kyriakou,
‘The impact of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights on the EU system of protection of rights: much ado
about nothing?’ (2001) 5 Web JCLI: http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2001/issue5/kyriakou5.html. Accessed
November 2003.
26

5

See section 2 below.

‘The dominant way of safeguarding fundamental rights is the rule of law’.27 The rule of
law is an integral part of fundamental rights protection and recognition of the rule of law
is embedded in the principal international conventions for the protection of fundamental
rights recognized by the Court of Justice as sources for the general principles of Union
law.28 In Golder the Court of Human Rights emphasized the importance of references to
the rule of law in the Statute of the Council of Europe and the ECHR as an interpretative
aid to the substantive rights conferred by the ECHR:
“It may also be accepted, as the Government have submitted, that
the Preamble does not include the rule of law in the object and
purpose of the Convention, but points to it as being one of the
features of the common spiritual heritage of the member States of
the Council of Europe. The Court however considers, like the
Commission, that it would be a mistake to see in this reference a
merely “more or less rhetorical reference”, devoid of relevance for
those interpreting the Convention. One reason why the signatory
Governments decided to “take the first steps for the collective
enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the Universal
Declaration” was their profound belief in the rule of law”.29
The Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) and the Treaty Establishing the European
Community (“TEC”) likewise affirm the importance of respecting the rule of law.30
Recital two of the Preamble to the Charter also refers to the rule of law and the
substantive Articles of the Charter enshrine a number of the basic rights constituting both
the formal and substantive elements of the rule of law. The draft Constitution
consolidates these provisions in Article I-2: “The Union is founded on the values of
respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights. These values are common to the Member States in a society of pluralism,
tolerance, justice, solidarity and non-discrimination”. Article I-58, incorporating
provisions relating to suspension of membership rights, retains the reference to “a clear
risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values mentioned in Article I-2” as the
trigger for sanctions. Article I-56 refers to the values of the Union as the basis for
27

Armin von Bogdandy, ‘The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights and the
Core of the European Union’ (2000) 37 CMLRev. 1307, at 1311-1312. For a useful survey of legal
scholarship relating to the rule of law see: David Dyzenhaus, ‘Recrafting the Rule of Law’, in David
Dyzenhaus (ed.) Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (Hart Publishing, 1999) 1.

28

See, for example, Articles 6 and 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 16 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ‘ICCPR’).
29

30

Golder v United Kingdom (1975) 1 EHRR 524, at para. 34.

Third preamble of the TEU and Articles 6(1) TEU and 7 TEU. Article 177 TEC refers to ‘developing and
consolidating’ the rule of law in Community development co-operation policies and Article 220 TEC
provides: ‘The Court of Justice shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law
is observed’. For an analysis of the role played by Article 220 TEC in the relationship between the rule of
law and fundamental rights developed by the Court of Justice as general principles see: T.Kyriakou, op. cit.
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developing a special relationship with neighboring states. The incorporation of the
Charter by Article I–7(1) and the mandate for the Union under Article I-7(2) to seek
accession to the ECHR would strengthen the link between protection of fundamental
rights and the rule of law in the Union’s new constitution.
Notwithstanding the clear connection established by international human rights treaties
between respect for human rights and the rule of law, the relationship between the two
principles has been problematic in the context of Union law. Firstly, protection of
fundamental rights was developed by the Court of Justice on the basis of general
principles of law rather than on the basis of a constitutional bill of rights.31 As such the
principles originally depended for their legitimacy on the integrity of the judicial process
rather than democratic validation . Secondly, the Charter sets itself out as recognizing
rather than creating the ‘rights, freedoms and principles’ set out in the Charter and is not
as yet integrated into the Union’s legal order.32 Nevertheless, Advocates-General and the
Court of First Instance have referred to the Charter as an authoritative statement of
human rights standards applicable in Union law33 which raises the issue of whether such
judicial activism is consistent with the principles of the rule of law.34 Thirdly, Title IV of
the TEC and Title VI of the TEU, which contain provisions establishing a “common area
of freedom, security and justice”, provide more limited access to democratic control and
judicial review of Community measures than in other areas of Community law.35
The tension between the role of the judiciary and the legislature in the field of
fundamental rights reflects the more general problem of democratic legitimacy in the
Union. In a political structure where human rights are constitutionalised, encroachment of
judicial powers is restricted but in the case of the Union the lack of an original
constitutional basis for human rights protection allowed scope for judicial expansionism
both as regards the delimitation of powers between the community institutions and
between the Community and the Member States raising issues of compatibility with the
rule of law both as a substantive and procedural doctrine.36 Two views on the application
31

See for a summary of the development of the Court of Justice’s role: Bruno De Witte, ‘The Past and
Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights’, in P. Alston, M. Bustelo
and J. Heenan (eds), op. cit., 859.
32

For an appraisal of the normative status of the Charter see: C.Engel, ‘The European Charter of Human
Rights: A Changed Political Opportunity Structure and its Normative Consequences’ (2001) 7 ELJ 151.
33

See J.Morijn, op. cit.

34

See for a summary of the position of ‘democratic positivists’ who contest the role of the judiciary in
developing rules of law and ‘liberal anti-positivists’ who support such a role: D. Dzyenhaus, op. cit., at 2-3.
35

See for a comprehensive review of this area: S. Peers: ‘Human Rights and the Third Pillar’, in P. Alston,
M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit., 167; and S. Peers, EU Justice and Home Affairs (Pearson, 2000).

36

See P.Craig, ‘Formal and Substantive Conceptions of the Rule of Law: An Analytical Framework’
(1997) Public Law 467. For a discussion of the arguments about ‘majoritarian democracy’ as the preferred
system of protecting the rule of law see: J. Goldsworthy, ‘Legislative Sovereignty and the Rule of Law’ in
T. Campbell, K.D. Ewing, and A. Tomkins (eds), op. cit., 61.
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of the rule of law to the European Union have been identified:37 “pro-ECJ scholars” who
concluded that “the traditional characteristics of the rule of law are preserved at the E.U.
level: along the lines of the traditional Rechsstaat, independence from other institutional
actors and consistency of adjudication obtains throughout the system” and “juro-sceptics”
who argue “that a rule of law other than one confined exclusively to economic integration
is unlikely to emerge in the near future” on the basis that the Court of Justice “lacks the
necessary autonomy to keep the other political institutions from enacting arbitrary and
inconsistent policies”.38
The provisions of the draft Constitution incorporated on the basis of the
recommendations made by WG II significantly alter the terms of debate over the
relationship between fundamental rights protection and the rule of law in the Union.
Incorporation of the Charter and Union accession to the ECHR would provide the Union
with a clearly defined constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights. In
particular, accession to the ECHR would weaken the argument that the rule of law does
not apply fully to the Union on the basis of a lack of autonomy on the part of the Court of
Justice.39 However, Article I-7(3) and Articles II-52(4) and 52(5) would undermine these
benefits from a rule of law perspective.
Article I-7(3), a modified version of Article 6(2) TEU, substitutes for the obligation for
the Union to “respect” as general principles of “Community” law fundamental rights as
guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to
the Member States, the stipulation that such rights shall “constitute” general principles
“of the Union’s law”. The retention of the reference to the common constitutional
traditions and the ECHR as sources of general principles of law in Article I-7(3) seems
designed to retain a dynamic element to the protection of fundamental rights in Union
law. 40 However, the Court of Justice’s references to such common constitutional
traditions have been perfunctory: “One could even say that the Court of Justice is not
genuinely interested in finding out whether there is a ‘common tradition’ among the
Member States concerning the legal regime of a particular rule. References to specific
national legal systems are perfunctory and haphazard. A national constitutional judgment
has never been cited”.41 Accession of the new Member States will further complicate
37

J. P. McCormick, ‘Supranational Challenges to the Rule of Law: The Case of the European Union’ in
David Dyzenhaus (ed.), op. cit., 267.
38

Ibid, at 280-281.

39

WG II in its Report concentrated on a different aspect of autonomy, namely whether accession of the
Union to the ECHR would impact adversely ‘on the principle of autonomy of Community (or Union) law
including the position and authority of the European Court of Justice’ (p.12). As discussed in section 6
below their views on this issue seem misguided.
40

While Working Party II made no recommendation on retention, those members in favour argued that
such a reference ‘could serve to complete the protection offered by the Charter and clarify that Union law is
open for future evolutions in ECHR and Member States’ human rights law’: the Report, at 9.
41
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Bruno de Witte, op. cit., at 878.

reliance on such traditions. Furthermore, the reference to the ECHR is otiose since, even
if accession negotiations to the ECHR were to fail, the Charter already substantially
recognises the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR.42 WG II emphasized that
Article 52(3) of the Charter, incorporated unamended as Article II-52(3), means that if
Charter rights correspond to ECHR rights they shall have the same scope and meaning as
laid down in the ECHR but that, according to the second sentence of Article 52(3), this
does not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection than the ECHR if Union
legislation subsequently so provides or provisions of the Charter, although based on the
ECHR, provided more extensive protection.43 In the light of the minimum standard of
protection guaranteed by Article II-52(3), even if the Union does not accede to the
ECHR, it is difficult to see how retaining ECHR rights as a source of general principles
of Union law could materially add to the same, or enhanced, rights set out in the Charter.
One argument in favour of retaining Article I-7(3) is that the general principles derived
from the ECHR could be used by the Court of Justice to recognize rights not protected
under the Charter but protected under the ECHR on the basis of Article II-53. Such a
lacuna might develop as a result of divergent case law between the Court of Justice and
the Court of Human Rights.44 However, this is rather an argument in favour of the
Union’s accession to the ECHR if the Charter is incorporated. Incorporation of the
Charter will increase the risk of such divergence since “experience tends to show that it is
difficult to avoid contradictions where two differently worded texts on the same subjectmatter are interpreted by two different courts” and the “provisions of Article 52 and 53 of
the EU Charter will probably not be sufficient to avoid the risk of contradictions,
certainly not where the application and interpretation of the Charter and the ECHR by
national courts is concerned”.45 Another argument for retaining I-7(3), that “the scope of
application ratione materiae of the Charter is more limited than the protection offered by
the present system of guaranteeing respect of fundamental rights in the EU flowing from
Article 6(2) juncto Article 46(d) EU”,46 would lose much of its persuasiveness following
incorporation of the Charter into the Union’s Constitution. If the Charter is incorporated,
the inclusion of Article I-7(3) should therefore be rejected as undermining certainty in

42

‘It means that, by and large, the substantive provisions of the European Convention have been
incorporated [in the Charter], although not exactly in the same wording’: L. Betten, Human Rights, (2001)
50 ICLQ 690, at 692.
43

The Report, at 7. WG II refers to Articles 47 and 50 of the Charter as examples of provisions providing
more extensive protection.
44

It seems unlikely that the Court of Justice would interpret the Charter so as to give rise to such conflicts,
although the timing of judgments on similar issues might give rise to inadvertent conflicts.
45

Study of Technical and Legal Issues of a Possible EC/EU Accession to the ECHR dated September 28,
2002 by the Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH) of the Council of Europe (the CDDH Report),
reproduced in WD No 8 of WG II, at 26-27. Available on the Convention website.
46

K.Lenaerts and E.E. de Smijter, ‘A “Bill of Rights” for the European Union’ (2001) 38 CMLR 273, at
281.
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identification of the Union’s fundamental rights.47 Accession by the Union to
international treaties protecting fundamental rights in addition to the ECHR would
provide a preferable method of improving the protection available under the Charter and
the ECHR to the retention of general principles under Article I-7(3).48
Secondly, Article II-52(4) provides: ‘Insofar as this Charter recognizes fundamental
rights as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
those rights shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions’. WG II, with two
members dissenting, justified Article II-52(4) on the basis it served to emphasize the
“firm roots” of the Charter in the common constitutional traditions of the Member States
and “in the interest of smooth incorporation of the Charter as a legally binding
document”.49 This argument suggests the purpose of inserting Article II-52(4) was
political expediency rather than an objective analysis of its merits. Apart from the
difficulty of identifying such traditions, such a rule of interpretation if applied literally
risks freezing the interpretation of the Charter articles concerned to reflect the
constitutional traditions of the current Member States.
WG II then sets out how it considers Article II-52(4) should be applied: “the Charter
rights concerned should be interpreted in a way offering a high standard of protection
which is adequate for the law of the Union and in harmony with the common
constitutional traditions”. This contradictory terminology apparently reflects academic
arguments in favour of the application of differential standards of human rights,50
although the Report claims to reject the argument that the Court of Justice should adopt a
“lowest common denominator” approach to Charter rights derived from the common
constitutional traditions.51 However, the reference to an interpretation “in harmony with
those traditions” is so vague that it is hard to see how the Court of Justice could give it
any substantive effect. In practice, the Court of Justice is more likely discreetly to ignore
the provision as political rhetoric. A further objection to Article II-52(4) is that since the
Charter does not, with good cause, explicitly identify the rights derived from the common
constitutional traditions nor which traditions form the source of such rights, one is
47

The WG II discussion paper dated June 18, 2002 sets out admirably the objections to retaining an
equivalent to Article 6(2) TEU (CONV 116/02), at 10; available on the Convention website. See also
C.Engel’s recommendation to eliminate Article 6(2) TEU if the Charter were incorporated ‘lest the
Community create a ‘lawyers paradise’ on fundamental rights’, op. cit., at 167.
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For a discussion of options for enhancing protection of human rights under Community law see: G.Gaja,
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M.Bustelo and J.Heenan (eds.), op. cit., at 796-800. It has been argued the Community could, without a
Treaty amendment, currently accede to the European Social Charter, the Convention of the Council of
Europe on Data Protection and the Vienna Convention on Human Rights and Application of Biology and
Medicine: P.Alston and J.H.H.Weiler, op. cit., at 31. See further J.H.H.Weiler and S.C. Fries, ‘EC & EU
Competences in Human Rights’, in P. Alston, M. Bustelo and J. Heenan (eds.), op. cit., 147.
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obliged to refer to the “Explanations” to the Charter (the Explanations),52 which
requirement weakens the authority of the Charter and risks solidifying the rights
protected by it. As has been aptly stated: “Good constitutions are short and enigmatic”.53
WG II also proposed, with two members having reservations, a new provision which has
been inserted as Article II-52(5): “The provisions of this Charter which contain principles
may be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by the institutions and bodies
of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law, in
the exercise of their respective powers. They shall be judicially cognizable only in the
interpretation of such acts and in the ruling on their legality”. According to WG II Article
II-52(5) would be “consistent both with the case-law of the Court of Justice and with the
approach of the Member States’ constitutional systems to ‘principles’ particularly in the
field of social law”.54 It provided reassurance that “future jurisprudence” will be able to
rule on the ‘exact attribution of articles to the two categories” (right or principle) by
referring to the wording of the respective articles of the Charter “taking into account the
important guidance provided by the Explanations, supplemented by explanations from
the current Working Group”.55
Several criticisms may be made of Article II-52(5). Firstly, it constitutes an attribution of
legislative competence, although it fails to define the modalities of its exercise, which is
out of place in a constitutional rights instrument such as the Charter and conflicts with
Article II-51(2), which is an amended version of Article 51(2) of the Charter,56 since it
establishes a new legislative power for the Union. Secondly, by restricting judicial
cognizance of Charter principles to implementing legislation it deprives the principles of
legal effect in the absence of such legislation. Since many of the principles are of a
general nature and relate to areas where community action is likely to be dilatory, this
would risk relegating the principles to the fate of many Christmas poinsettias: left to
wither after due credit has been taken for their initial bloom. Thirdly, it creates a rigid
distinction between the legal effect of those provisions of the Charter recognizing rights
and those containing principles, whereas Article 51(1) of the Charter simply provides the
Member Sates shall “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers”. Article II-52(5) therefore
constitutes a substantive change to the structure of the Charter the recommendation of
which fell outside the scope of WG II’s competence and does not correspond to the
‘technical drafting adjustments’ which it was at pains to stress was the limit of its remit.57
52

Contained in document CHARTE 4473/00 CONVENT 49 of October 11, 2000. Available on the
Convention website.
53

C.Engel, op. cit., at 151.
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55

The Report, at 8.

56

See further section 3 below.

57

The Report, at 4-5.

11

Finally, WG II emphasized the importance of the Explanations as an important tool in
ensuring a “correct understanding of the Charter” and proposed the explanations
contained in their report should be “fully integrated with the original Explanations”.58
This suggestion was in part adopted by the Convention through an addition to the
Preamble to the Charter set out in Part Two of the draft Constitution: “In this context the
Charter will be interpreted by the courts of the Union and the Member States with due
regard to the explanations prepared at the instigation of the Praesidium of the Convention
which drafted the Charter”. However, the Explanations were formulated on the basis they
should have “no legal value”59 and a change to their status would undermine the
transparency and accessibility of fundamental rights in the new constitution and
jeopardize a dynamic interpretation of the Charter rights and principles by the Court of
Justice.60 The analysis of Article 53 of the Charter in the Explanations demonstrates the
danger of according them legal status (emphasis added): ‘This provision is intended to
maintain the level of protection currently afforded within their respective scope by
Union law, national law and international law.’61 Such an interpretation would
unnecessarily exclude from the scope of Article II-53 future conventions protecting
fundamental rights to which the Union acceded.
3. Incorporation of the Charter and the relationship between National and Union
Law
Human rights norms can have either an integrating or destabilizing effect on the
relationship between the Union’s legal order and the national legal orders of the Member
States.62 The initial impetus for the development by the Court of Justice of human rights
norms within the community legal system was provided by the decisions of the
constitutional courts of Germany and Italy challenging the legitimacy of the principle of
supremacy of community law developed by the Court of Justice in the absence of such
norms.63 In this context the development of human rights norms had an integrating
function. However, the extension by the Court of Justice of the application of these norms
to actions by the Member States both in implementing Community law (Wachauf64) and
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Ibid, at 10. The British Government endorsed this proposal, op. cit., at para.102.
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See the Explanations, op. cit., at 1.
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On the requirement for transparency and clarity in the Union’s instruments and procedures, see the Final
Report of Working Group IX, CONV 424/02, Brussels November 29, 2002. Available on the Convention
website.
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The Explanations, op. cit., at 50.
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See on the integrating effect of the Charter: C.Engel, op. cit., at 154.
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See Bruno de Witte, op. cit.
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in derogating from the application of Community law (ERT65) created the potential for
conflicts between the requirements of national constitutionally protected rights and those
developed by the Court of Justice.66 This has led some commentators to argue that
different standards should be applied by the Court of Justice to the protection of human
rights for Community measures from those measures adopted by the Member States in
derogation of their Community obligations in order to protect the Member State’s margin
of appreciation in such situations.67
The proclamation of the Charter outside the legislative framework of the Treaties
reflected the tensions between conflicting national and Union perceptions as to the role of
human rights norms in the Union legal order. Concerns over incorporation of the Charter
relate both to extension of Union competence through the back-door of human rights
protection and also the relationship between the Charter provisions and national human
rights standards.68 The ‘horizontal’ provisions of the Charter, and in particular Articles
51(1) and (2) and Article 53, were designed to limit the potential for such conflicts.69
WG II recommended drafting amendments to Articles 51(1) and (2) and additional
‘horizontal’ provisions in Articles II-52(4), (5) and (6) and these were adopted verbatim
in the draft Constitution.70 Despite the Working Group’s claim that these are “technical
drafting adjustments”,71 an analysis of the changes shows they are potentially substantive
in nature72 and reflect the overriding concern of WG II to ensure that “incorporation of
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Case C-260/89, ERT v DEP [1991] ECR 1-2925.
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An example of such conflict occurred in Case C-285/98, Kreil v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2000]
ECR 1-0069. For analysis of the case see J. Schwarze, op. cit., at 28-29. SPUC v. Grogan is an example of
a case where the Court of Justice avoided having to resolve such a conflict: Case C-159/90 [1991] ECR
4685.
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J.H.H.Weiler, ‘Fundamental Rights and Fundamental Boundaries: On Standards and Values in the
Protection of Human Rights’ in N.A. Neuwahl and A. Osas (eds.) The European Union and Human Rights
(Kluwer, 1995) 51. But see also L.Besselink: ‘Entrapped by the Maximum Standard: On Fundamental
Rights, Pluralism and Subsidiarity in the European Union’ (1998) 35 CMLRev. 629. See also Armin de
Bogdandy’s arguments in favor of differential human rights standard to be applied by the Union in the field
of foreign relations, national measures implementing Union law, and acts of the Union’s institutions, op.
cit., at 1318-1319.
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CMLRev. 945; and J.Bering, ‘Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of
Community Law?’; LLM dissertation, Liisberg, NYU School of Law at:
http://jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/01/010401.html; accessed November 2003.
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the Charter will in no way modify the allocation of competences between the Union and
the Member States”.73
Article 51(1) of the Charter is modified in Article II-51(1) by the addition of “agencies”
to “institutions” and “bodies” of the Union as addressees of the provisions of the
Charter74 and the insertion at the end of the second sentence of the phrase “and
respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it by the other Parts
of the Constitution”. Article 51(2) is amended in Article II-51(2) as highlighted to read:
“This Charter does not extend the scope of application of Union law beyond the
powers of the Union or establish any new power or task for the Union, or modify
powers and tasks defined in the other Parts of the Constitution”. The reasons which
led WG II to recommend these modifications emphasizing the jurisdictional boundaries
of the Charter are difficult to discern from the Report,75 or indeed why the Convention
should have adopted the proposals verbatim. The Report acknowledges that the existing
text of Article 51(2) of the Charter addresses the issue of allocation of competences
between the Union and the Member States.76 The underlying rationale, as part of the
strategy of making incorporation more palatable to wavering Member States,77 seems to
have been to reinforce a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the Charter as
constituting a record of existing human rights protection under Union law rather than an
interpretation of the Charter as a dynamic contribution to “strengthening EU fundamental
rights protection”.78
However, the first sentence from Article 51(1) of the Charter is retained unamended in
Article II-51(1), whereby the Charter provisions are addressed to the Member States
“only when they are implementing Union law”. WG II specifically endorsed this
provision by reference to the principle of subsidiarity,79 although this utilitarian test as set
out in Article I-9(3) hardly seems relevant to the issue of the scope of the Court of
Justice’s judicial review powers over violations of Charter rights. The Charter will
therefore not apply to the exercise of derogations by the Member States from their
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This amendment was not proposed by WG II.

75

The Report does refer in support of the amendment to Article 51(2) of the Charter to the established case
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78

P.Eeckhout, op.cit., at 981.

79

The Report, at 5.

14

obligations under Union law,80 unless the Court of Justice were to adopt a strained
interpretation of Article II-51(1) to bring it into line with its general principles case law.81
An alternative route for the Court of Justice would be to bypass the limitation under
Article II-51(1) by continuing to apply the wider criteria developed in its general
principles case law on the basis of Article I-7(3). Such an approach, however, would
create an unfortunate dichotomy between the scope of protection for Charter rights and
Article I-7(3) protected rights.
Following the recommendation of WG II, a new Article II-52(6) provides: “Full account
shall be taken of national laws and practices as specified in this Charter”. The Report
justifies this new provision by reference to the principle of subsidiarity referred to in the
Preamble and Article 51(1) of the Charter and ‘from those Charter Articles which make
references to national laws and practices’.82 Again it is difficult to attribute any specific
meaning to this provision. Firstly, the principle of subsidiarity was relevant to
determining the original scope of the Charter, as made clear in Article 51(1) of the
Charter, but not to the interpretation of the Charter provisions, whether or not referring
to national laws and practices. Secondly, on each occasion the Charter refers to national
laws and practices it is clear from the relevant Article that the exercise of the right shall
be determined in accordance with such national laws and practices and therefore Article
II-52(6) adds nothing to the Charter’s existing text; as indeed Article II-52(6) recognises
by providing that full account shall be taken of national laws and practices “as specified
in the Charter”.
In conclusion, the Report contributed little of substance to the debate over the boundaries
between Union protection of fundamental rights and national constitutional protection.
The proposals made, and adopted verbatim by the Convention, were of a conservative
nature designed to assuage the concerns of Member States opposed to incorporation of
the Charter. It is, however, doubtful if the changes to Articles 51(1) and (2) of the Charter
and the new provisions incorporated in Article II-52(4), (5), and (6) will in fact be
interpreted by the Court of Justice as altering the existing allocation of competences
under the Charter.
4. The control of derogations from fundamental rights in the Union’s legal order
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The Report, at p.5 (n.2), states: ‘It should be noted that, upon possible incorporation of the Charter into
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The history of Nazi Germany, Vichy France and apartheid South Africa83 exemplify the
dangers of a failure of judicial integrity in countering attempts to circumvent
constitutional protection of fundamental rights by the expedient of derogations84 based on
concepts such as ‘public emergency’, ‘terrorism’ or ‘state security’. The responses of
governments to the events of September 11, 2001 have highlighted the contemporary
need for vigilance in times of public emergency.85 Although the Union currently lacks
some of the key characteristics of a sovereign state, notably an autonomous military
capability, police force, or security service,86 and has not developed a coherent legal
framework for regulating the use of derogations from fundamental rights protection in
emergency situations, as its powers are extended into areas prone to generate conflicts
with fundamental rights, in particular relating to the “area of freedom, security and
justice” established by Title VI of the TEU and Title IV of the TEC,87 the development
of such a framework is pressing. In this section, the sources and control of the use of
derogations under Union law will be examined in the context of the proposals in the draft
Constitution.
The principal international human rights treaties provide for derogations88 but only from
non-core rights, which vary from treaty to treaty. However, even in respect of derogable
rights international treaties have been interpreted to restrict the freedom of states in the
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‘EU Responses to Terrorism’ (2003) 52 ICLQ 227; and C.Warbrick, ‘The Principles of the European
Convention of Human Rights and the Responses of States to Terrorism’ (2002) 3 EHRLR 287.
86

But see the proposals for enabling an expansion of the role of Europol and Eurojust in the final report of
Working Group X “Freedom, Security and Justice” (CONV 426/02); available on the Convention website.
87
For the proposed extension of Union competence in this area, see the Final Report of Working Group X,
op. cit Following the events of September 11, 2001, the Union adopted, inter alia, a Council Framework
Decision on combating terrorism of 13 June 2002 (OJ 2002 L 164/3) and a Council Framework Decision of
13 June 2002 on the European Arrest Warrant (OJ 2002 L 190/1). On the Framework Decision on
terrorism, see S.Peers, op. cit., and on the European arrest warrant, see ‘Memo on the European Arrest
warrant as part of a move towards an area of freedom, security and justice in the EU’, a JUSTICE briefing,
January 2002 at: http:///www.justice.org.uk/ourwork/eu/index.html. Accessed November 2003.
88

For example, Articles 4(1) and (2) of the ICCPR; Articles 27(1) and (2) of the American Convention of
Human Rights (ACHR); and Articles 15(1) and (2) of the ECHR. See generally,J. Fitzpatrick: ‘Protection
against Abuse of the concept of “Emergency”’ in L. Henkin and J.Lawrence (eds.) Human Rights: An
Agenda for the Next Century ’ (Hargrove, 1993).

16

exercise of such derogations.89 As regards derogations from fundamental rights under
Union law, three situations will need to be distinguished if the proposals in the draft
Constitution on fundamental rights are adopted: firstly, derogations which form part of
the Union’s general principles of law as they apply either to the institutions of the Union
or to the Member States implementing or derogating from their obligations under Union
law; secondly, derogations from Charter rights which may be broadly sub-divided into
rights which result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States,
rights which correspond to ECHR rights, and rights which are based on the EC Treaty or
the EU Treaty;90 and thirdly, the specific case of the terms on which the Union could
avail of the derogations provisions under Article 15 of the ECHR.
In respect of the first instance, the Court of Justice has established that fundamental rights
derived from the common constitutional traditions apply to the acts of the institutions and
the Member States but that the rights are subject to limitations: “Within the Community
legal order it likewise seems legitimate that these rights should, if necessary, be subject to
certain limits justified by the overall objectives pursued by the Community, on condition
that the substance of these rights is left untouched”.91 In respect of fundamental rights
derived from the ECHR, and capable of being subject to restriction, the Court of Justice
has applied a similar test.92 As regards the scope of its jurisdiction to review derogations
by a Member State from its obligations under the Treaties, the Court of Justice initially
held that it had no power to control the conformity of national law with general principles
of Union law, including fundamental rights, which falls outside the scope of Union law.93
In subsequent case law, however, the Court of Justice has narrowed the scope of those
judgments by holding that when a Member State seeks to justify a restriction on a
fundamental freedom under the Treaties by relying on a derogation provision of the
Treaties, that justification would be reviewed for its compatibility with the general
principles of Union law, including fundamental rights.94
89

For example see Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1987) 11 EHRR
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Insofar as the second category is concerned, the general provision controlling the exercise
of derogations is Article 52(1) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-52(1): “Any
limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognised by this Charter must be
provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the
principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and
genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to
protect the rights and freedoms of others”. This provision is based on the Court of
Justice’s case law on the permitted scope of derogations.95 Charter rights corresponding
to ECHR rights have, however, also to be read subject to the first sentence of Article
52(3) of the Charter, reproduced in Article II-52(3), which provides that the “meaning
and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down” by the ECHR. WG II
interprets this provision to mean it “includes notably the detailed provisions in the ECHR
which permit limitations of these rights”.96 WG II does not, however, clarify whether the
second sentence of Article 52(3),97 which provides the provision shall ‘not prevent Union
law providing more extensive protection’ than the ECHR and is retained in draft Article
II-52(3), would mean the limitation provisions in the ECHR could also be more strictly
construed by the Court of Justice. Such an interpretation would be welcome as permitting
a higher standard of protection to be developed by the Court of Justice. As regards rights
in the Charter that correspond to the non-derogable rights set out in the ECHR,98 it seems
reasonable to argue by analogy that they should be construed as not being capable of
restriction under Article II-52(1) on the basis such restriction would breach the minimum
equivalent standard of Article II-52(3).

subjects the application of a derogation to the principle of proportionality and a narrow construction of the
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or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3), the prohibition of slavery or servitude (Article 4(1)) and
the principle of non-retroactivity of criminal laws (Article 7): see J.Fitzpatrick in L.Henkin and
J.L.Hargrove, op. cit., at 209. The corresponding Charter rights are set out in Articles 2, 4, 5 and 49: see the
Explanations, op. cit.
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As regards Charter rights derived from the EC Treaty or the EU Treaty,99 Article 52(2)
has been retained substantially unamended as Article II-52(2): “Rights recognized by this
Charter for which provision is made in other Parts of the Constitution shall be exercised
under the conditions and within the limits defined by these relevant Parts”. WG II
recommended retention of Article 52(2), subject to the necessary technical drafting
amendments to reflect the Charter’s incorporation,100 to ensure “complete compatibility
between the statements of the rights in the Charter and their more detailed regulation as
currently found in the EC Treaty”.101 In contrast to Article II-52(3), therefore, Charter
rights which correspond to an EC or EU Treaty right pursuant to Article 52(2) may be
subject to the same restrictions and “do not enjoy broader protection than the original
rights”.102
Thirdly, until the Union accedes to the ECHR it obviously cannot avail of the specific
derogation provisions in Article 15 ECHR.103 The accession treaty of the Union to the
ECHR will clearly have to address the terms on which the Union can avail of Article 15.
Although the CDDH Report proposed that terms referring specifically to states in the
ECHR should apply mutatis mutandis to the Union, without redefining each such term so
as ‘to tailor them to the EC/EU, which would be a highly complicated exercise’,104 it is
doubtful that that such a broad-brush approach could be applied to the criteria established
by the Court of Human Rights to control the exercise of derogations under Article 15.105
Rather than relying on the Court of Human Rights to develop a new version of the
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Lawless formula to apply to the Union, it would be preferable for the accession treaty to
establish separate derogation criteria appropriate for the Union.
In conclusion, incorporation of the Charter and accession by the Union to the ECHR
would provide substantial benefits in clarifying and strengthening the law applicable to
derogations from fundamental rights in Union law. Article II-52(1) will codify and
entrench106 the case law of the Court of Justice on controlling restrictions on fundamental
rights in respect of Charter rights and accession to the ECHR will provide a well
established control mechanism by the Court of Human Rights of derogations by the
Union from its ECHR obligations. However, as this brief analysis of the conditions for
the control of the exercise of derogations in Union law has demonstrated, the complexity
and duplication of sources for fundamental rights protection under the proposals in the
draft Constitution strongly militates in favour of simplification by removing reference to
general principles of law as a source of fundamental rights under Article I-7(3).

5. Enforceability of fundamental rights under the Union’s Constitution
The relationship of fundamental rights to the legal order has long been debated and in
particular whether a necessary connection to effective enforcement mechanisms must
exist for fundamental rights to progress beyond, in Bentham’s phrase, “nonsense on
stilts”.107 In the Union’s political process, however, fundamental rights discourse fulfills
a number of functions, some of which are not dependent on legal enforcement
mechanisms.108 For example, the role played by the European Parliament in promoting a
coherent fundamental rights policy in the Union also served as a means of expanding “its
powers and responsibilities to topics which did not actually fall within its normal
remit”.109 However, it is generally agreed that increased rights of access to judicial
enforcement mechanisms is a key element in promoting the effective protection of
fundamental rights.110
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On entrenchment, see section 7 below.
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In addition to accession by the Union to the ECHR and incorporation of the Charter, the
principal reform proposals made in the context of the Union to achieve this objective
have included: the relaxation of the standing requirements under Article 230(4) TEC; the
creation of an individual human rights complaint procedure; and access to the Court of
Justice for public interest institutions.111 WG II considered and rejected the idea of
creating a special procedure for the protection of fundamental rights before the Court of
Justice;112 it decided not to make any recommendations to the Convention on the reform
of Article 230(4) TEC;113 and it did not consider the issue of locus standi for public
interest institutions. Part III of the draft Constitution only addresses the first issue in
Article III-270(4), which is a substantial reworking of Article 230(4) to take account of
the change in the denomination of the Union’s legal instruments.114 Article III-270(4)
constitutes a partial loosening of the “direct and individual concern” test as regards a
“regulatory act” but not an “act”115 by providing that any natural or legal person may
challenge a regulatory act which is “of direct concern to him or her and does not entail
implementing measures”.
WG II did, however, briefly refer to the “possibility of a provision in the Treaty on the
obligation of Member States, as spelt out in the recent case law, to provided for effective
remedies for rights derived from Union law”.116 This proposal was taken up in Article I28, paragraph 2: “The Member States shall provide rights of appeal sufficient to ensure
effective legal protection in the field of Union law”. This is no doubt intended to buttress
the obligation of sincere co-operation incumbent on the Member States under Article 10
TEC and restated in Articles I-5(2) and I-10(2) of the draft Constitution and codifies the
existing case law of the Court of Justice.117 As regards the widely acknowledged lacunae
111
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in judicial protection in respect of Third Pillar measures,118 WG II took the view the issue
was outside its remit.119 Working Group X on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’ concluded
that “the general system of jurisdiction of the Court of Justice should be extended to the
area of freedom, security and justice, including action by Union bodies in this field”.120
The Convention followed this recommendation since Article III-270(1) provides
jurisdiction for the Court of Justice to review “the legality of European laws and
framework laws, of acts of the Council of Ministers, of the Commission and of the
European Central Bank, other than recommendations and opinions, and of acts of the
European Parliament intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties” which
includes the acts which may be adopted under Chapter IV of Part III of the draft
Constitution relating to the “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice”.
In the context of improved access to justice, the two most significant benefits from
implementation of the draft Constitution would be the individual right of application
under Article 34 of the ECHR and the possibility for individuals to avail of Charter rights
directly before the Court of Justice and national courts. Both issues were, however, only
briefly discussed by WG II.121 The effect of incorporation of the Charter on creating
justiciable rights for individuals is the more problematic. Incorporation of the Charter
would, according to WG II, make ‘the Union’s present system of remedies available’.122
This makes the point that incorporation of the Charter would result in Charter rights
being directly justiciable by the Court of Justice and national courts applying Union law
rather than, as presently, indirectly as a source for general principles of Union law. In
addition, the extension of the Court of Justice’s jurisdiction under the draft Constitution
in the “area of freedom, security and justice” would materially enlarge the scope of the
justiciability of Charter rights. However, the retention of a modified version of Article
51(1) of the Charter in Article II-51(1) seems designed to retain the fundamental structure
of the Charter as an instrument of judicial review rather than conferring on individuals a
remedy for an alleged violation of a Charter right independently of “an accessory
instrument which violates a rights included in the Charter”.123 The introduction of an
independent remedy based on an alleged violation of fundamental rights was
118

For the current jurisdiction of the Court of Justice in respect of the Third Pillar see Bruno de Witte, op.
cit., at 885-886. See also N. Neuwahl, ‘The place of the citizen in the European construction’, in P.Lynch ,
N.Neuwahl and W.Rees (eds.) Reforming the European Union: from Maastricht to Amsterdam (Longman,
2000), at 195-196.
119

The Report, at 16, n.3.

120

Final report of Working Group X on ‘Freedom, Security and Justice’, CONV 426/02 of December 2,
2002, at 25. Available on the Convention website.
121

For the right of individual application to the ECHR, see Working Document 21, op. cit., at 4. The
CDDH considered the technical aspects of an individual application as regards joinder of the
Union/Member States as co-defendants in the CDDH Report, op. cit., at 18-19.

122

123

The Report, at 15.

L.Betten, op. cit., at 695. I am indebted for this analysis to his perspicacious comments on the Charter as
an instrument for constitutional review of Community Acts, ibid , at 694-697.

22

canvassed124 but rejected by WG II and the Convention. A person seeking to seek a
judicial remedy for a breach of a Charter right will therefore have to bring themselves
within the scope of one of the existing judicial remedies.125

6. Accession to the ECHR: the Union at last?
Convergence between the Community institutions and those of the Council of Europe had
already been discussed at the time of the founding of the Communities.126 Although the
original Treaties did not incorporate any reference to the ECHR, or indeed any
fundamental rights standards, the Court of Justice in a series of cases beginning with
Rutili127 made explicit reference to the ECHR. The Parliament, Council and Commission
issued a Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977 concerning the Protection of Fundamental
Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms128 confirming their respect for the fundamental rights protected
under the Court of Justice’s case law on general principles, including those derived from
the ECHR. In 1979 the Commission reversed its earlier opposition to accession by the
Communities to the ECHR.129 Article F(2) TEU, introduced by the Maastricht Treaty
and renumbered as Article 6(2) by the Amsterdam Treaty, enshrined the fundamental
rights protected by the ECHR as general principles of Community law. In November
1993 the Council submitted the issue of accession by the Community to the ECHR for an
opinion under Article 300(6) TEC but the Court of Justice concluded that the Community
did not have competence to accede to the EC Treaty and accession would require its
amendment under Article 236 TEC (now Article 48 TEU).130 The intergovernmental
conferences leading up to the Amsterdam and Nice Treaties did not, however, amend the
Treaties to permit accession. The issue of the accession to the ECHR was raised at the
Laeken European Council meeting of December 2001 and submitted for consideration by
the European Convention.131
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The recommendation of WG II to include a constitutional authorisation enabling the
Union to accede to the ECHR132 was in this context hardly controversial.133 The
Convention broadly accepted the recommendation but strengthened its terms from an
authorisation to an injunction in Article I-7(2): “The Union shall seek accession to the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Accession to that Convention shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the
Constitution”. This obligation is tempered, however, by the provision in Article III227(7) that accession shall be subject to the consent of the European Parliament and in
Article III-227(9) that the Council must act unanimously throughout the accession
procedure.134
The inclusion of the second sentence in Article I-7(2), specifying that accession to the
ECHR shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the draft Constitution, was
the result of a proposal of WG II135 and was one of three “technical devices” it
recommended to ensure the “Union’s accession to the ECHR does not modify the
allocation of competences” between the Union and the Member States.136 WG II was
concerned to ensure that accession by the Union to the ECHR “would thus not lead to any
extension of the Union’s competences, let alone to the establishment of a general
competence of the Union on fundamental rights”.137 However, WG II never set out how
accession to the ECHR could lead to such results and indeed acknowledges that the
preparatory work for accession proceeded on the opposite assumption.138 In any event
the definition of the Union’s competences as set out in the draft Constitution are so fluid
that the statement in Article I-7(2) that accession to the ECHR shall not ‘affect’ the
132
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Union’s competences seems too broad: accession may well constrain, and thus affect, the
Union’s competences.
A further issue arising from accession to the ECHR is the extent to which the Court of
Justice will be obliged to follow the case law of the Court of Human Rights on the
interpretation of the ECHR.139 Specific references to the jurisprudence of the Court of
Human Rights by the Court of Justice had until recently been infrequent140 and it has
been argued that the Court of Justice “is not legally obliged to follow the interpretation of
the European Court of Human Rights”.141 The details of the structuring of the
relationship between the Court of Justice and the Court of Human Rights will be crucial
in determining whether the Court of Human Rights is to be recognized as a superior court
to the Court of Justice as regards interpretation of the ECHR following accession.142 It is
submitted that the terms of accession of the Union to the ECHR should make clear that
the Court of Justice should be bound to follow a ruling of the Court of Human Rights in
order to maximize the benefits of accession by the Union to the ECHR143 and to avoid
possible conflicts between the Union’s legal order and the ECHR.144 Article II-52(3)
would in any event oblige the Court of Justice to review the relevant case law of the
Court of Human Rights in order to ensure that those Charter rights which correspond to
ECHR rights have the same “meaning and scope” as the ECHR rights.
A wider but related issue relates to the principle of the autonomy of the Union’s legal
order. WG II was of the opinion that this principle would not place any legal obstacle to
accession since the “Court of Justice would remain the sole supreme arbiter of questions
of Union law and on the validity of Union Acts; the European Court of Human Rights
could not be regarded as a superior Court but rather as a specialized court exercising
external control over the international law obligations of the Union resulting from
accession to the ECHR”.145 This conclusion is, however, debatable. As the CDDH
Report makes clear, a procedure before the Court of Justice would not be considered a
139
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procedure of “international investigation or settlement” in the sense of Article 35(2)(b)
ECHR and “the mere fact that a case has been dealt with by the Luxembourg Court
should not prevent the Strasbourg Court from accepting an application as admissible”.146
If the Court of Human Rights found that a judgment of the Court of Justice had failed to
protect an ECHR right, the Court of Justice would be obliged to follow the decision of
the Court of Human Rights under Article 46(1) ECHR, provided the Union was a party to
the proceedings before the Court of Human Rights. Furthermore, proposed changes to
the ECHR whereby the Committee of Ministers would be given power to institute
infringement proceedings “against a State that would persistently refuse to comply with a
judgment of the Court”,147 could apply to a persistent failure by the Court of Justice to
adopt its interpretation of the ECHR to that of the Court of Human Rights.
7. Incorporation of the Charter: A Bill of Rights for the Union?
A "bill of rights is a formal commitment to the protection of those rights which are
considered, at that moment in history, to be of particular importance. It is, in principle,
binding upon the government and can be overridden, if at all, only with significant
difficulty. Some form of redress is provided in the event that violations occur”.148 It is
the purpose of this section to evaluate whether incorporation of the Charter would
provide the Union with a bill of rights according to Philip Alston’s definition. The other
elements of the Union’s protection of fundamental rights set out in Article I-7, accession
to the ECHR and retention of fundamental rights as general principles of law, are not
included in this analysis since, as has been argued, retention of the general principles
would add little of substance to the Charter rights and principles149 and, until the terms of
accession by the Union to the ECHR are negotiated, it is difficult to assess the
contribution of Union accession to the ECHR.
It is reasonably clear that the Charter satisfies Philip Alston’s first criterion both in the
form it was adopted in December 2000 and a fortiori if incorporated on the terms set out
in the draft Constitution. The fourth paragraph of the Charter’s Preamble in both versions
clearly affirms its claim to modernity through its mission to “strengthen the protection of
fundamental rights in the light of changes in society, social progress and scientific and
technological developments by making those rights more visible in a Charter” and the
breadth of the rights recognized by the Charter has generally been acknowledged.

146

CDDH Report, op. cit., at 16-17.

147

See the CDDH report to the Council of Europe of 8 April 2003 on guaranteeing the long-term
effectiveness of the ECHR: CM(2003)55, proposal C.4. Available at
http://www.coe.int/T/F/Droits_de_l’Homme/2003cm55.asp. Accessed November 2003.
148

P.Alston, ‘A Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Bills of Rights’ in P.Alston (ed.) Promoting
Human Rights Through Bills of Rights: Comparative Perspectives (OUP, 1999), at 10.
149

For a study of the Charter rights in the context of the Court of Justice’s existing case law on fundamental
rights, see: K.Lenaerts and E.E. de Smijter, op. cit.

26

As regards the binding nature of the Charter on the Union’s government, this would be
achieved through the combined effect of Article I-7(1) and the reformulated version of
Article 51(1) of the Charter set out in Article II-51(1). Article I-7(1) requires the Union to
“recognise the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter” and Article II-51(1)
requires the “institutions, bodies and agencies of the Union with due regard for the
principle of subsdiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing
Union law” to “respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application
thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the
powers of the Union as conferred on it in the other Parts of the Constitution”.150 It is
difficult to justify the differences in terminology between Article I-7(1) and II-51(1) other
than by reference to the perceived political imperative of retaining and strengthening the
jurisdictional elements of Article 51(1) of the Charter. Nevertheless, it is clear that that
the incorporated Charter would create binding legal obligations on the Union’s governing
institutions and any failure to fulfill those obligations within the parameters set out in the
Constitution would found an action for judicial review of acts adopted in breach of those
obligations. Incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution would
alter the normative status of the Charter by allowing direct judicial reference to the
Charter rather than through the indirect route of the general principles case law.151
“So that it appeareth plainly, to my understanding, both from reason, and from Scripture,
that the sovereign power, whether placed in one man, as in monarchy, or in one assembly
of men, as in popular, and aristocratical commonwealths, is as great, as possibly men can
be imagined to make it”.152 While Thomas Hobbes would no doubt have needed some
persuading of the merits of entrenching constitutional fundamental rights,153
incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution will achieve
entrenchment according to the definition formulated by Philip Alston. Article IV-7
elaborates on the current procedure for amending the TEU and TEC under Article 48
TEU but retains the core requirements that any amendments to the Constitution require
firstly the “common accord” of the conference of the representatives of the governments
of the Member States and secondly the ratification of the amendments by each of the
Member States “in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements”. Both
from the perspective of historical precedent and the Union’s enlargement, it would be
difficult to argue against the proposition that overriding the Charter rights by amendment
to the Constitution could only be done “with significant difficulty”.
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The final characteristic of a bill of rights according to Philip Alston’s definition, requiring
some form of redress to be provided in the event that violations of rights occur, is the
most problematic under the Charter’s existing status and would so remain, albeit to a
more limited extent, if the Charter were incorporated on the terms of the draft
Constitution. In particular, the limitation of the scope of application of Charter rights
under Article II-51 would pose real problems of effective judicial redress: “Insofar as the
Charter contains rights which are not based on the E.C. Treaty or E.U. Treaty, these
rights can offer legal protection only to the extent that they relate to the current exercise
of powers by the Community, the Union or the Member States implementing Union law.
The statement of rights that cannot be linked to such an exercise of power mainly has a
political function”.154 There may therefore be an infringement of Charter rights which,
independently of the issue of the adequacy of Union remedies for breaches of
fundamental rights, will not be subject to legal redress since it falls outside the
competence of Union law. While it could be argued that there is no infringement, since
Article II-51 defines Charter rights so as to exclude their application in such a situation,
such an argument is unattractive since instead of making the Charter rights ‘more
visible’,155 incorporation threatens to make them more illusory.
In conclusion, the incorporation of the Charter on the terms of the draft Constitution falls
at the last hurdle when measured against the criteria for a bill of rights identified by
Philip Alston. While it may justifiably be argued that such a restriction on the scope of
the Charter rights is inevitable to maintain the jurisdictional balance between the Union
and the Member States and render the Charter politically acceptable,156 the Charter rights
could nevertheless have been redrafted to take account of the Union’s competences under
the draft Constitution. However, such a task was outside the remit of WG II and never a
political option for the Convention.
8.

Conclusion – success at a price

In recommending the incorporation of the Charter and authorization for the Union to
accede to the ECHR, WG II has made two important contributions to the draft
Constitution and, if they are implemented, the protection of fundamental rights in the
Union will benefit from a transparent, principled and securely entrenched constitutional
basis. The subsequent accession by the Union to the ECHR would provide an
autonomous system of control over the protection of fundamental rights and an important
additional bulwark against any abuse of the Union’s enhanced powers, particularly in the
“common area of freedom, security and justice” currently covered by the Third Pillar and
Title IV TEC.
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While both of these proposals were predictable, the potential opposition of some Member
States to either or both of these measures meant that WG II was conservative both in its
approach to the terms on which the Charter should be incorporated and in its analysis of
the effect on the Union’s legal order of accession to the ECHR. As a result, several of the
subsidiary recommendations in the Report were prompted more by a desire to smooth the
passage of the primary recommendations than a principled reflection on the role of
fundamental rights protection under the new Constitution. In particular, the retention of
general principles as a source of fundamental rights under the new Constitution would
undermine from a rule of law perspective the benefits of having a codified system of
protection in the Charter and the ECHR. In a similar vein, the drafting amendments to
the Charter incorporated in the draft Constitution appear driven by the need to assuage
Member State sensibility as to the allocation of competences in the field of fundamental
rights protection and detract from the existing text of the Charter.157
Political reality suggests that the IGC is unlikely to devote substantial time to the detailed
amendments resulting from the proposals of WG II. Incorporation of the Charter and a
mandate for the Union to accede to the ECHR no longer seem controversial, at least at
the IGC level, and the additional ‘safeguards’ built into the draft Constitution against an
encroachment of Union competence in the protection of fundamental rights are unlikely
to be challenged but rather welcomed as a useful armory to deploy in the struggle to
secure ratification of the new Constitution. The contentious issues for the future
development of fundamental rights protection in the Union are more likely to center on
the terms of accession of the Union to the ECHR and alternative mechanisms for
updating fundamental rights protection if Council unanimity is required for amendments
of the new Constitution. While the ‘technical’ amendments resulting from the Report
may seem of minor significance in comparison, it would be regrettable if the IGC fails to
take full advantage of this unique opportunity to establish a unified, coherent and
simplified constitutional basis for the protection of fundamental rights in the Union.
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